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Abstract
In this paper, we offer an algorithm for intelligent decision making about travel path
planning in mobile vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), for scenarios where agents
representing vehicles exchange reports about traffic. One challenge that arises is how
best to model the trustworthiness of those traffic reports. To this end, we outline an
algorithm for effectively soliciting, receiving and analyzing the trustworthiness of these
reports, to drive a vehicle?s decision about the path to follow. Distinct from earlier work,
we clarify the need for specifying the conditions under which reports are exchanged
and for processing non-binary reports, culminating in a proposed algorithm to achieve
that processing, as part of the trust modeling and path planning. To validate our
approach we then offer a detailed evaluation framework that achieves large scale
simulation of traffic, travel and reporting of information, confirming the value of our
proposed approach by demonstrating the average speed of vehicles which follow our
algorithm (compared to ones that do not). This experimental framework is promoted
as a significant contribution towards the goal of evaluating trust algorithms for
intelligent decision making in traffic scenarios.
Keywords: Multi-faceted trust modeling; Multiagent systems; VANET; Vehicle routing;
Traffic control
Introduction
In this paper, we present a method for exchanging reports between agents in multia-
gent systems that allows the trustworthiness of peers providing non-binary information
to be modeled, as part of an agent?s decision making process. We are motivated by the
problem of enabling agents to make travel decisions based on traffic reports received by
peers, in a setting of mobile vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). In this environment,
maintaining a multi-faceted trust model is of value and our proposal for supporting non-
binary reports ultimately integrates each facet of this trust model, in order for an agent
to determine which travel path to follow. For example, a non-binary report could indi-
cate a traffic congestion figure, rather than a binary response to a question such as ?Is the
traffic heavy??. Our starting point is a model that includes a calculation of the consensus
opinion about roads from the majority of agents, but that assumes only binary reports.
From here, we sketch algorithms that clarify in greater detail how to support effective
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communication between the agents in the environment and how this would then dictate
the travel decision making of an agent who is receiving traffic reports from peers.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we introduce a detailed
testbed that simulates vehicles traveling in an environment, making path planning deci-
sions based on non-binary traffic reports from peers whose trustworthiness has been
modeled. We offer an extensive set of simulations that serve to validate our approach,
illustrating how effective the average path time taken by our vehicles is, in comparison
with a best case scenario with perfect knowledge and with models that integrate less
detailed trust modeling.
The dual contributions are: i) an effective decision making process for intelligent agents
in VANET environments where trust is modeled and non-binary reports are exchanged ii)
an extensive testbed of use for measuring the value of different trust modeling algorithms,
in travel environments where agents exchange reports.We clarify the importance of these
contributions in comparison with related work in the field.
Background: multi-faceted trust model
In this section, we outline our original framework for modeling trust in VANET envi-
ronments ([1-3]). We consider the driver of each vehicle in our VANET environment to
be represented by an agent. In order for each vehicle on the road to make effective traf-
fic decisions, information is sought from other vehiclesa (about the traffic congestion on
a particular road). As a result, for each driver an intelligent agent constructs and main-
tains a model for each of the other vehicles. Travel decisions are then made based on
a multi-faceted model of agentb trustworthiness. This is necessary because when asked,
each agent may report inaccurate traffic congestion, in an effort to deflect other vehicles
from certain roads. In particular, we propose a core processing algorithm to be used by
each agent that seeks advice (about travel paths, based on traffic) from other vehicles in
the environment as summarized below.
Algorithm 1: Computation Steps
while on theroad do
Send requests and receive responses;
if in need of advice then
Choose n; //number of agents to ask for advice
//according to roles and experiences
Prioritize n agents;
if response consensus > acceptable ratio then
Follow advice in response;
else
Follow advice of agent with highest role and highest trust value;
Verify reliability of advice;
Update agents? trust values;
In order to cope with possible data sparsity, various facets (highlighted in this section
in bold) of each agent are taken into consideration when reasoning about travel, includ-
ing the agent?s role, location and inherent trustworthiness (determined on the basis of
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past experiences with this particular agent - i.e. whether past advice has proven to be
trustworthy). Each of these facets of the agent is stored within the trust model.
We first acknowledge that certain vehicles in the environment may play a particular
role and, on this basis, merit greater estimates of trustworthiness. For example, there
may be vehicles representing the police and other traffic authorities (authority) or ones
representing radio stations dedicated to determining accurate traffic reports by maintain-
ing vehicles in the vicinity of the central routes (expert). Or there may be a collection of
agents representing a ?commuter pool?, routinely traveling the same route, sharing advice
(seniority).
Consideration of any past personal experienceswith agents allows themodel to include
any learning about particular agents due to previous encounters, specifically modeling
trustworthiness each time and adjusting the level of trust to be higher or lower, based on
the outcome of the advice that is offered. The equations which adjust experience-based
trust are as below:
TA(B) ← TA(B) + α(1 ? TA(B)) (1)
TA(B) ← TA(B) + β(1 ? TA(B)) (2)
Experience-based trustworthiness is represented and maintained following the model
of [4] where TA(B) ∈ (? 1, 1) represents A?s trust inB (with -1 for total distrust and 1 for
total trust) which is incremented by 0 < α < 1 using Equation (1) if B?s advice is found
to be reliable (positive experience), or decremented by ? 1 < β < 0 using Equation (2) if
unreliable (negative experience), with β > α to reflect that trust is harder to build up but
easier to tear down. Distinct from the original model of [4], the values of α and β can be
set to be event-specific. For example, when asking about a major accident, these values
may be set high, to reflect considerable disappointment with inaccurate advice. We also
incorporate a requirement for agents to reveal whether the traffic information they are
providing has been directly observed or only indirectly inferred from other reports that
agent has received. The critical distinction of direct or indirect reporting then influences
the values set for α and β , introducing greater penalties for disappointment with direct
advice. In [2] we discuss at greater length the incentives to honesty that are introduced
within this framework; for brevity, we omit that discussion in this paper.
A central calculation to influence the travel decision of each agent is the determination
ofmajority consensus amongst the agents providing advice about a particular road. The
agent maintains, as part of her model of other agents, a list of agents to ask for advice.
This list is ordered from higher roles to lower roles with each groupGi of agents of similar
roles being ordered from higher experience-based trust ratings to lower ratings. The agent
sets a value n and asks the first n agentsc from her ordered list the question (thus using
priority-based trust), receives their responses (reports), and then performs majority-
based trust measurement. Suppose that q of these n agents declare that their reports are
from direct experience/observation. The requesting agent determines whether there are
sufficient direct witnesses such that she can make a decision based solely on their reports.
If q ≥ Nmin, then the requesting agent will only consider the reports from the q direct
witnesses if a majority consensus on a response can be reached, up to some tolerance
set by the requester (e.g. the agent may want at most 30% of the responders to disagree),
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then the response is taken as the advice and followed. If q < Nmin, then there are insuf-
ficient direct witnesses; the agent will consider reports from both direct and indirect
witnesses, assigning different weight factors to them, computing and following the major-
ity opinion. (Once the actual road conditions are verified, the requesting agent adjusts
the experience-based trust ratings of the reporting agents: It penalizes (rewards) more
those agents who reported incorrect (correct) information in the direct experience case
than those agents with incorrect (correct) information in the indirect experience case.)
If a majority consensus cannot be reached, then instead, the agent relies on role-based
trust and experience-based trust (e.g., taking the advice from the agent with highest role
and highest experience trust value). Note that in order to eventually admit new agents
into consideration, the agent will also ask a certain number of agents beyond the nth one
in the list. The responses here will not be considered for decision, but will be verified to
update experience-based trust ratings and some of these agents may make it into the top
n agents, in this way.
The computation of majority consensus adheres to the set of formulae outlined as fol-
lows: Suppose agent A receives a set of m reports R = {R1,R2, . . . ,Rm} from a set of n
other agents B = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bn} regarding an event. Agent A will consider more heavily
the reports sent by agents who have higher level roles and larger experience-based trust
values. When performing majority-based process, we also take into account the location
closeness between the reporting agent and the reported event, and the closeness between
the time when the event has taken place and that of receiving the report. We define Ct
(time closeness), Cl (location closeness), Te (experience-based trust) and Tr (role-based
trust). Note that all these parameters belong to the interval (0, 1) except that Te needs to
be scaled to fit within this interval by (Te + 1)/2.
For each agent Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) belonging to a subset of agents B(Rj) ⊆ B who report
the same report Rj ∈ R (1 ≤ j ≤ m), we aggregate the effect of its report according to
the above factors. The aggregated effect E(Rj) from reports sent by agents in B(Rj) can be







W (Bi) is a weight factor set to 1 if agent Bi who sent report Rj is an indirect witness, and
W (Bi) is set to a value in (0, 1) if user Bi is a direct witnessd.
A majority consensus can be reached if
M(R)∑
Rj∈R E(Rj)
≥ 1 ? ε (4)
where ε ∈ (0, 1) is set by agent A to represent the maximum error rate that A can accept
and M(R) = maxRj∈R E(Rj). A majority consensus can be reached if the percentage of
the opinion (the effect among different reports) over all possible opinions is above the
threshold set by agent A.
The trust modeling framework described so far clarifies the algorithms that lead to the
calculation of the trustworthiness value which would then be stored in each agent model.
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Trip planning decisions of a vehicle would then be made in light of these particular agent
models. One element that requires further clarification is detailed agent communication
protocols to exchange reports. This is elaborated in the section that follows.
Agent communication protocols to exchange reports
The framework in [3] (see also [1,2]) is designed with a pull based communication proto-
col, where agents send requests to other agents for information. In addition to this classic
pull oriented design, we introduce a push based protocol for broadcasting information.
These protocols dictate when communication is initiated and to whom. Either or both of
the two protocols can be used for communicating information between agents. Algorithm
2 describes the push and pull based protocol and how a priority road information request
is sent by agents. This is part of our proposal for specifying when trust modeling should
be integrated into the decision making process of these agents.
We note that this algorithm serves to provide important detail and clarification to
advance the earlier proposal of [3]. In that work, the messaging proposed was vague. It
was suggested that the message content (congestion information about a road) would be a
?yes? or ?no? response to a question ?Is this road congested?? and that this response would
be pulled to the requesting agent. When the pulls would occur was left vague as ?in need
of advice?. As such, which roads were being investigated was also left unspecified. The
concept of a priority road, introduced below, facilitates messaging and serves to provide
the clearer specification of communication. Roads are placed into priority for an agent if
there is a gap of information about congestion; subsequent to receiving a report about a
priority road, that road?s status may be altered to cause it to be removed from the priority
list (if sufficient information on that road has accumulated). How agents choose to desig-
nate a road as priority can be left as an implementation detail. In the simulations used to
validate our model, if road information was empty or was sufficiently old, that road would
be added to the priority list.
Algorithm 2: Pull and Push Based Communication
while on the road do
if Triggered according to communication frequency then
//Pull protocol
//Get road to request advice about and agent to request from
if priority road exists then
Choose highest priority road;
Get trustworthy agent;
if Trustworthy agent exists then
Send request to trustworthy agent for advice concerning the high
priority road;
else
Send request to any agent for advice concerning the high priority road;
//Push protocol
//Broadcast current location and congestion to agents
Broadcast current location and congestion;
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The pull protocol allows agents (requester) to request information from other agents
(requestee). The trustworthiness of the information from the requestee agent is modeled
and used to determine what path to follow based on the report produced. On the other
hand, the push protocol allows agents to send information to other agents, even if it were
not requested. The trustworthiness of the sender agent is still modeled; this may then
be employed during decision making about travel paths. Both of these protocols are set
to occur according to a certain communication frequency; this is the tactic employed
during our simulation of traffic which serves to provide the validation of our proposed
framework (see Section ?Simulation results?). Setting the communication to happen fairly
frequently allows agents to inquire about any roads for which they lack sufficient guidance
and keeps the information flowing between agents, from the push broadcasting.
Three types of messages are supported within our protocol. The three messages are
a transmission of an agent?s location and congestion (Location and Congestion Push), a
request for congestion information about a specific road (Priority Road Information Pull
Request), and a response for congestion information about a specific road (Priority Road
Information Pull Response).
We begin with a clarification of how our messaging framework would support trust
modeling in the context of Boolean traffic reports. Algorithm 1 theoretically sends
requests only to agents in a prioritized list, when advice was needed. Our proposed update
to this algorithm, shown in Algorithm 3, would have each agent?s knowledge base con-
tinuously updated with periodic messages, from the pull, push or both protocols. When
advice is needed, the most relevant and trustworthy reports are chosen and used.
Algorithm 3: NewMajority Computation Steps, with Advice Gathering Update
while on the road do
Send requests and receive responses;
if in need of advice then
Choose n reports R; //number of reports to use for advice
Check Priority Road(Current Road);//to help update the Priority list
Prioritize n reports; //according to roles and experiences
if response consensus > acceptable ratio then
Follow advice in response;
else
Follow advice of agent with highest role and highest trust value;
Verify reliability of advice;
Update agents? trust values;
The work by Minhas et al. mentioned in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust
model? presented a Multi-faceted Trust Management Framework that was described as
operational for Boolean values of congestion (Heavy (True), Light (False)). In order to cal-
culate a majority opinion, reports which featured the same Boolean value of congestion
were aggregated together. The percentage of reports with same congestion value would
be compared against a threshold to determine whether the advice would be followed.
The trust modeling itself respects the formulae outlined in Section ?Background: multi-
faceted trust model?. The use of a new advice gathering protocol (as per Algorithm 2)
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would not intrinsically alter the majority opinion calculation; it simply clarifies how traf-
fic reports are retrieved. Note that calling Check Priority Road(Current Road) within this
algorithm has the eventual effect of coping with stale or missing information on roads
that are critical to current path planning.
Our proposed numeric trust modeling
In this section we clarify how our framework could support the use of numeric traf-
fic reports, leading to a ?confidence metric? used for trust modeling, in contrast to the
Boolean evaluation of traffic in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust model?. Our new
proposed confidencemetric and use of numeric congestion and trust values serve to allow
a more accurate description of traffic and agent information.
The original theory in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust model? assumed that
congestion would be communicated as a simple true (Heavy) or false (Light), stating either
that the road was congested or not. However, direct application may result in an unfair
and biased calculation of the majority opinion. This is because determining whether a
road is congested or not is a subjective opinion and is prone to inaccuracies. Also, by rep-
resenting the congestion as a Boolean, this severely limits the system?s ability to compare
roads, evaluate agents, and make the best decisions. Our proposed model seeks to allevi-
ate this problem by representing congestion as a number, which will bring a more suitable
level of accuracy to the systeme.
Formula (3) shows the calculation for the aggregated effect of a majority opinion.
The new way of representing congestion as a numeric value requires a careful recast-
ing of formula (3). (3) aggregates the effect of all agents that sent the same report (i.e.
cong = true). This simple aggregation of similar reports is impossible with the new con-
gestion representation because there are no longer only two types of reports (Cong=true
or Cong=false). In the new framework, each report must be evaluated for addition into
the majority opinion system. This is done by giving the report a confidence and then
evaluating it for inclusion into the majority opinion (similar to the aggregated effect
calculation).
The following sections will detail how the factors of experience and role based trust,
time and location closeness, and whether the advice is direct or indirect are incorporated
into our proposed confidence metric and utilized in calculating a majority opinion.
Confidence calculation
Confidence functions as a metric similar to trust, and is calculated by combining many
different report and agent factors, which were introduced in Formula (3) and will be
described in detail later in this section. These factors include experience and role based
trust, time and location closeness, and whether the advice is direct or indirect.
Our proposed equation for calculating confidence must effectively replace Formula
(3), while representing a trust-like metric. Modifications to confidence should then be
reflected in a manner similar to how trust is increased and decreased in Equations (1) and
(2). α and β function in these equations as a standard for increasing and decreasing trust,
respectively. For our proposed confidence calculation it did not make sense to atomically
increase or decrease the value according to the influencing factor (role, time closeness,
etc.). The increase or decrease should reflect the significance of the factor. As a result, our
proposed confidence metric replaces Formula (3) with Equation (6), where Equations (1)
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and (2) are used as the basis for calculating the confidence of report Rj, through amodified
summation of a geometric seriesf.
The factors of role based trust, time and location closeness, and whether the advice is
direct or indirect in Formula (3), are reflected through Variable (G). Each factor is inte-
grated, in turn, yielding an overall Conf value. In order to do so, G needs to be calculated,
as explained in the subsections that followg. Experience based trust of an agent auto-
matically forms the default value of the confidence metric (CurrConf (Rj)). Variable (G)
represents the number of timesh to increase or decrease confidence. G?s calculation is
specific to each factor. If G is calculated to a negative value, this indicates that β should
be used instead of α. Examples are shown in Section ?Confidence calculation examples?.
The following sections briefly detail how each factor influences G; however the exact cal-
culations are dependent on how parameter values are chosen, within an implementation.
γ (G,α,β) =
{
α if G ≥ 0
β otherwise
(5)
Conf (Rj) = (CurrConf (Rj) ? 1)(1 ? γ (G,α,β))G + 1 (6)
Majority
Majority based trust is incorporated into our framework as a core algorithm for deter-
mining the trustworthiness of an agent, to then dictate whether to believe the congestion
value reported about a road, which influences path planning. Section ?Background: multi-
faceted trust model? describes majority based trust as a consensus, with a value which
has been agreed upon by many agents. For our proposed non-Boolean extension to trust
modeling, majority based trust is described as an opinion, where a similar value has been
agreed upon by many agents. The rationale for the change from a Boolean based con-
gestion value to a numerical congestion value was described in the beginning of Section
?Our proposed numeric trust modeling?.
The advice is used by choosing and prioritizing information from various reports and
calculating a majority opinion, which is followed if its confidence is above a thresh-
old, similar to the threshold of Equation 4. The primary advice presented in Section
?Background: multi-faceted trust model? would be road congestion reports, which would
be used to help an agent decide what roads to take and which to avoid by considering all
the facets of the multidimensional trust model. This continues to hold in our framework.
In our calculation, if the confidence is below a threshold, then the advice is used from the
report with the highest confidence.
The majority opinion is calculated using Algorithm 4. All relevant advice reports refer-
encing a location are retrieved and prioritized into a list of size n. The majority opinion
is then calculated, stored, and reported back to the agent. If a report contains informa-
tion that is suspicious with respect to other reports that have been observed, such as an
extremely high congestion report, the sender is reported as a suspicious agent. Labeling
agents as suspicious is helpful in order to remove them from consideration, regardless
of their current trustworthiness value. The framework will then process the suspicious
agent, profiling it and updating its trust value in the knowledge base.
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Algorithm 4: NewMajority Computation Steps, with Numerical Congestion Metric
while on the road do
Send requests and receive responses;
if in need of advice then
Choose n reports R; //number of reports to use for advice
Check Priority Road(Current Road);//to help update the Priority list
Prioritize n reports; //according to Confidence (roles, experiences, time,
location, and if report is indirect or direct)
foreach n reports do
if Rj suspicious then
Report suspicious agent Rj;
else
Include report Rj in Majority;
ifMajority suspicious then
Decrease Majority confidence;
ifMajority confidence > acceptable threshold && Number of reports > n
threshold then
Follow advice in response;
else
Follow advice of report with highest confidence;
Verify reliability of reports;
Update users? trust values;
Majority calculation
Algorithm 4 is a modified algorithm from Algorithm 1, which shows the calculation of
a majority opinion in the framework. The algorithm uses suspicious agent detection in
helping to avoid the inclusion of congestion advice which is outside a standard deviation
from the current majority congestion. The majority opinion is used if there are at least n
agents to use advice from and the majority confidence is above the majority threshold.
Suspicion calculation
Suspicion detection is important to include to help avoid congestion advice that greatly
deviated from the current majority. Only using advice that has similar congestion reports
forms our majority opinion, rather than conceiving of majority opinion as just an average
congestion of the highest trusted agents (n).
If an agent is deemed suspicious, then they are reported and the agent?s advice is not
used in the majority opinion calculation. However, the reverse is possible where if an
agent?s advice has higher confidence than the majority and confidence greatly deviates
from the majority. If this happens then the majority confidence is decreased proportion-
ally and the agent?s advice is potentially used as thereport with highest confidence.
Experience
Experience based trust is the most basic type of trust and is applied to every agent in
our framework. As detailed in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust model?, it is trust
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as a result of direct experiences with the individual agent. This is updated when the
model encounters information that it can use in a judgmental nature. An example of such
information would be from detecting suspicious information being reported by an agent,
encountering definitive information that can be used as a comparison factor against infor-
mation previously reported by an agent, or processing the opinion of a more trusted agent
about the agent in question. Since experience based trust is the most basic type of trust,
this forms the basis of the confidence calculation.
This facet of trust management is very simple but powerful. Section ?Simulation results?
demonstrates this through basic simulations which only use experience and majority
based trust.
Role
Experience based trust is a powerful tool for profiling agents; however, it is often chal-
lenged in scenarios with data sparsity. Data sparsity is an absence of agents with which the
resident agent has had previous experience. This is often the case in the real world where
it is rare to encounter a car which you have previously profiled.
Role based trust helps alleviate the issue of data sparsity by assigning roles to agents
in our framework. As detailed in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust model?, pre-
defined roles (e.g. police patrols, traffic reporters or taxi drivers) are assigned to all
agents in the system. Different roles may be associated with different levels of trust. The
model uses the four different types of roles, motivated by the classification of Minhas
et al: Ordinary, Seniority (e.g. commuter pool), Expert (e.g. news station car), Authority
(e.g. police).
Role based trust is incorporated into a proposition?s confidence calculation by increas-
ing it by a magnitude proportional to the particular role?s rank. Equation 7 shows how
G is calculated for Equation 6. RPenal is a standard value for weighting roles, and RoleR-
ank is the rank of the roles. G is inversely proportional to RoleRank so that higher roles
(Authority has RoleRank of 2) warrant greater increases in confidence.
G = RPenal/RoleRank (7)
Time/Location
It can often be the case that an agent receives a great deal of reports about a road, with
some being more accurate than others. A combination of time and location closeness is
used in confidence calculations to determine how accurate reports are. Time closeness is
a measure of how old the report is with respect to when the advice is needed. Location
closeness is a measure of how how far the agent providing the report is to the road in
question.
Time and location closeness helps alleviate the issue of old and inaccurate reports by
assigning these metrics to traffic report propositions and using them in confidence calcu-
lations in our framework. As detailed in Section ?Background: multi-faceted trust model?,
metrics of time and location closeness are used in calculating a majority consensus. Our
proposed model similarly uses these metrics in calculating a majority opinion, through
modifying the confidence of propositions by a magnitude inversely proportional to these
metricsi.
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Equations 8 and 9 show how G is calculated for Equation 6. TPenal and LPenal are
standard values for weighting time and location respectfully. TimeDifference and LocDif-
ference are time difference and location difference respectively. MultiplicativeFactor is a
standard multiplicative factor for the calculation (max confidence increase will beMulti-
plicativeFactor, and not 1, if TimeDifference or LocDifference is 0.). The calculation finds
the difference, for example, between Time Difference and TPenal and then divides the dif-
ference by TPenal. This achieves the purpose of scaling the values to be within their unit
metricsj.
G = (TPenal ? TimeDifference)/TPenal ∗ MultiplicativeFactor (8)
G = (LPenal ? LocDifference)/LPenal ∗ MultiplicativeFactor (9)
Direct/Indirect
The framework of this paper also incorporates the distinction of direct and indirect
reports. Direct reports are reports which have been directly observed and reported by
an agent. Indirect reports are direct reports of a third agent which are stored in the
knowledge base of the agent the resident agent is communicating with.
For example, when one agent (Ar) communicates with another agent (A2) through a
pull request concerning a priority road (R1), A2?s highest confidence traffic report con-
cerning R1 may have been reported by another agent (A3) and not A2. A2 would send
Ar the report and indicate that it is an indirect reportk (A2 did not create the report),
which would include A2?s confidence of the report. A2 calculates the confidence using the
report?s experience and role based trust, and time closenessl.
The inclusion of indirect reports, as opposed to only allowing direct reports, is impor-
tant because it greatly increases the response rate of a pull request concerning a priority
road. Indirect reports, however, may be more inaccurate than direct reports. This is taken
into consideration through the use of the corresponding agent?s confidence of the report
(A2?s confidence of the report) and by modifying the confidence value of a report by a
predetermined factor.
Equation 10 shows how G is calculated for Equation 6. InPenal is a standard value for
penalizing indirect reports, and IfIndirect is 1 if the report is indirect and 0 otherwise.
G = InPenal ∗ IfIndirect (10)
Confidence calculation examples
This subsection presents two examples which describe how the confidence metric for a
report is calculated according to the multidimensional trust factors of experience and role
based trust, location and time closeness, and whether the report is indirect or not. The
following examples will show iterative modifications to the confidence value of a report
according to the various factors.
The following calculation demonstrates how the confidence value for the report was
calculated. Note that all the parameter values used in these examples are the ones used in
our implementationm.
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Example 1. (illustrating α)
Confidence = Agent_39 : trust_degree (0.6)
Gtime = (TPenal(90) ? TimeDiff(18))/TPenal(90)
∗MultiplicativeFactor(1.5)
Gtime = 1.2
Confidence(0.6) = (Confidence(0.6) ? 1)(1 ? α)|Gtime| + 1
Confidence = 0.6475
Gloc = (LPenal(200) ? LocDiff(100))/LPenal(200)
∗MultiplicativeFactor(1.5)
Gloc = 0.75
Confidence(0.6475) = (Confidence(0.6475) ? 1)(1 ? α)|Gloc| + 1
Confidence = 0.674
Example 2. (illustrating β)
Confidence = Agent_41 : trust_degree (0.7)
Grole = RPenal(8)/RoleRank(2)
Grole = 4
Confidence(0.7) = (Confidence(0.7) ? 1)(1 ? α)|Grole| + 1
Confidence = 0.8032
Gtime = (TPenal(90) ? TimeDiff(180))/TPenal(90)
∗MultiplicativeFactor(1.5)
Gtime = ? 1.5
Confidence(0.7813) = (Confidence(0.7813) ? 1)(1 ? β)|Gtime| + 1
Confidence = 0.7413
Gloc = (LPenal(200) ? LocDiff(500))/LPenal(200)
∗MultiplicativeFactor(1.5)
Gloc = ? 2.25
Confidence(0.7604) = (Confidence(0.7604) ? 1)(1 ? β)|Gloc| + 1
Confidence = 0.6100
Gindirect = InPenal(? 2) ∗ IfIndirect(1)
Gindirect = ? 2
Confidence(0.6991) = (Confidence(0.6991) ? 1)(1 ? β)|Gindirect | + 1
Confidence = 0.4385
Travel decisions when using numeric trust modeling
Algorithm 4 clarifies whether an agent will choose to take a certain road or not based on
consensus about the congestion on the road. If the agent wants to reason about which
road to choose (from a set of possible roads), it can run Algorithm 4 for each road.
This algorithm is of use in scenarios such as the simulations we present in the following
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section, where a path planning algorithm is considering specific roads in order to propose
the one that is best for the agent?s decision making. This algorithm continues to clarify
our proposal for integrating trust modeling into agent decision making, in these travel
environments.
Simulation results
This section describes the simulation tests performed to compare and contrast the
effectiveness of our model?s implementation against a system that does not use traffic
information in routing and a best case scenario. Included in the comparisons displayed
in our graphs are less comprehensive trust modeling options. (For example, our pro-
posal with only experience-based and majority-based trust modeling is one comparator;
another is an algorithm that takes all reports at face value and does not incorporate trust
modeling at all).
We have designed an extensive simulation testbed that can be used to validate our
model by modeling traffic flow within an environment, tracking the path times of cars
to determine the effectiveness of travel decisions. When vehicles make path planning
decisions based on reports from other agents, if the accompanying trust modeling has
been effective, the vehicles? completion of travel paths should be timely. The implemen-
tation makes use of the following third party software, JiST/SWANS, vans, DUCKS, and
Protegen. JiST stands for Java in Simulation Time; it is a high-performance discrete
event simulation engine that runs over a standard Java Virtual Machine (JVM). SWANS
stands for Scalable Ad-hoc Network Simulator; it is built on top of the JiST platform
and serves as a host of network simulation tools. Vans is a project comprising the geo-
graphic routing and the integrated Street Random Waypoint model (STRAW). STRAW
utilizes an A* search algorithm to calculate shortest path to a destination. It also allows
realworld traffic to be simulated by using real maps with vehicular nodes (briefly illus-
trated in Appendix D). DUCKS is a simulation execution framework, which allows for a
Simulation Parameters file to be provided to define the simulation. Protege is a free, open
source ontology editor and knowledge base framework. Note that the simulation con-
structed here, while inspired by that employed for the original model of [3], goes far
beyond, to enable a rich modelling of traffic scenarios with effective measurement of
successful travel.
The simulation was set to poll cars every 6?15 seconds; with 100 cars in total, experi-
ence with every other car would be gained quicklyo. In order to simulate environments
with low experience-based trust, we introduce a variable called sparsity. For example,
80% sparsity resembles having a lack of previous experience with 80% of the agents. In
the simulation, this variable effectively ignores updates of trust values, thus hindering
experience-based trust.
These graphs chart the performance of simulations that either use trust modeling (i.e.
profiling (P), (Hon #) or notp (no P, Hon #)). Agent honesty represents the percent of hon-
est agents in the simulation (i.e. 0.5 is 50% honesty). Role-based trust (Role #) represents
the percent of agents in the simulation that have been assigned a role (i.e. 0.2 will have
20% of agents assigned a role). Sparsity (Spars #) represents the percent sparsity in the
simulation (i.e. 0.8 will have 80% sparsity). Dishonest lie percentage (Lie #) represents the
percent of the time which a dishonest agent will lie (i.e. 0.8 means dishonest agents will
lie 80% of the time)(set at 100% if unspecified).
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In Appendix B we display the various parameters set for the experiments and how
the values were chosen (while the path planning for the simulation is displayed in
Appendix C). Our first set of experiments incorporated experience-based trust and
majority-based trust, alone. These were the central elements of the originalmodel of [1-3].
We call this type of simulation Basic. Simulations with all the other additional compo-
nents added are referred to as Full. The other trust modeling components individually
indicated are time closeness (Time), location closeness (Loc), and indirect advice (Indir).
(Full) indicates when all multidimensional trust components are being used. The VANET
trust modeling results are also compared against two additional simulations: the first is
a worst case scenario where traffic is ignored (no traffic)q, and the other is a best case
omnipresent version (omni) which simulates the ability for any car to look up the exact
congestion of any road at anytime. All simulation tests results are averaged over 5 runs.
Figure 1 examines the average path time (appropriate due to the ultimate goal of reduc-
ing the travel time of users). This figure compares the worst case scenario against the best
case scenario and various simulations which use our VANET system with the Basic sim-
ulation settings, at different degrees of honesty. Greater average path time in the figure
indicates lower performance. The Basic, Hon 0.1 simulation did much worse than the
other Basic simulations most likely due to the extreme lack of trustworthy agents, but it
still performed significantly better than the Basic, No P, Hon 0.1 simulation. The Basic
curves that incorporate trust modeling show approximately a 35% decrease in average
path time over the worst case scenario. The curves in the scenarios are representative of
the simulations approaching a steady state. Another observed trend is the tendency for
the profiling-enabled simulations to reach a steady state faster than the other simulations.
The curves here are useful for the next experiment described below.
Figure 2 compares the worst case scenario against the best case scenario and various
simulations which use our VANET system with the Full (all trust multidimensional trust
components activated) simulation settings, at different degrees of honesty. As seen in
the figure, all of the simulations that used our trust modeling framework (Full) or the
omnipresent setup averaged close to the same path time at the end of the 10000 second
simulation. The other simulations produced a predictably declining performance as the
Figure 1 Avg Path Time comparison of our Basicmodel vs. best case, worst case, and No P scenarios.
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Figure 2 Avg Path Time comparison of our Fullmodel vs. best case, worst case, and No P scenarios.
honesty percentage approached the worst case scenario. In contrast with Figure 1, Full
simulations performed significantly better compared to the Basic simulations of similar
honesty.
Figure 3 compares the average path time, at 10,000 seconds, of the No Traffic, Omni,
Basic, Basic, No P, and Full scenarios, across a range of honesty values. No Traffic and
Figure 3 Avg Path Time comparison of simulation types over varying degrees of honesty at 10,000
seconds.
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Omni are shown as straight lines because they do not use honesty values, but are use-
ful as comparisons. The figure clearly shows the effectiveness of our framework across
the range of honesty values. The Basic scenario consistently performs better than the
Basic, No P scenario. The Full scenario also consistently performs better than the Basic
scenario. All of the framework enabled simulations have a similar average path time at
0% honesty because they have no useful traffic data (and at 100% honesty because there
are no untrustworthy agents to deflect through profiling). Figure 3 clearly demonstrates
the impact dishonest agents can have on simulations (Basic, No P) and the effectiveness
our proposed model framework scenarios (Basic and Full) can have on countering the
influence of dishonest agents.
Figure 4 demonstrates the increased effectiveness of each of the multidimensional
trust components described in Section ?Our proposed numeric trust modeling?. The
incremental components demonstrated are the base system (experience and majority
based trust), then role based trust (Role 0.2), time and location closeness (Time, Loc),
and indirect advice (Indirect). These simulations also simulate honesty at 50%, data
sparsity at 50%, and additionally compare them to the best case scenarior. As seen in
the figure, the incremental addition of trust components demonstrated predictable and
substantial increases in performance. The simulation with sparsity enabled showed a
predicably worse performance than its counterpart. This reflects the fact that when one
has little experience-based trust, one makes poorer decisions. The simulation with role-
based trust enabled shows a dramatic increase in performance, which demonstrates the
impact roles have in situations with data sparsity. The best case scenario and the sim-
ulations with the higher number of trust components averaged close to the same path
time at the end of the 10000 second simulation. The curves in the scenarios are rep-
resentative of the simulations approaching a steady state. Another observed trend is
the tendency for the component-enabled simulations to have a steadier state than the
other simulations.
Figure 5 explores variations in parameter values to demonstrate the robustness of
our proposed framework. We note that, even if there are very few roles assumed or if
dishonest agents lie inconsistently, our framework is able to adapt and yield excellent
Figure 4 Avg Path Time comparison, multidimensional trust component variations.
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Figure 5 Avg Path Time comparison, multidimensional parameter variations.
performance, approaching that of the Omni (omniscient) curve. When using all dimen-
sions (at least some or all of role, time, location, indirect), being more challenged with
experienced-based trust (higher sparsity) degrades performance slightly as does having
less role-based trust to rely on.
The final set of graphs show the robustness of our simulation framework through
experiments that modify simulation-specific variables, such as the number of agents and
messaging frequency.
Figure 6 compares the average path time, at 10,000 seconds, of the No Traffic, Omni,
Basic, Basic, No P, and Full scenarios, across a range of values for the number of agents
in the environment. The figure clearly shows the robustness of our framework across
the span of agent values. The simulations around 50 agents have approximately the same
path time because with such a small number of cars there is no real need for using traffic
information in path planning. When increasing the number of agents, the Basic scenario
consistently performs better than the Basic, No P scenario. The Full scenario also con-
sistently performs better than the Basic scenario, when there are more than 50 agents.
Figure 6 clearly demonstrates the robustness and scalability of our proposedmodel frame-
work and implementation across a range of values for the number of agents in the
environment.
Figure 7 compares the average path time, at 10,000 seconds, of the No Traffic, Omni,
Basic, Basic, No P, and Full scenarios, across various messaging intervals (where x-y
means that messages are sent every x to y seconds)s. The purpose of the figure is to
demonstrate the robustness of the simulations when there are more or fewer messages.
No Traffic and Omni are shown as straight lines because they do not use communica-
tion protocols, but are useful as comparisons. The figure clearly shows the robustness
of our framework, especially the Full scenario, across various messaging intervals. The
Basic scenario consistently performs better than the Basic, No P scenario until the mes-
sage interval increases to (12?30 seconds) at which point the two lines are comparable.
(This is because Basic is no longer receiving information at a sufficient frequency). The
Full scenario consistently performs better than the Basic scenario, with a more gradual
decrease in performance as the message interval increasest.
Cohen et al. Journal of Trust Management 2014, 1:10 Page 18 of 31
http://www.journaloftrustmanagement.com/content/1/1/10
Figure 6 Avg Path Time comparison, varying number of agents.
Figure 8 compares the average path time, at 10,000 seconds, of the No Traffic, Omni,
Basic, Basic, No P, and Full scenarios, with various communication protocols enabled.
No Traffic and Omni are listed under No Msgs because they do not use communication
protocols, but are useful as a comparison. This figure is important for backing up our
claim in Section ?Agent communication protocols to exchange reports? that replacing the
pull protocol, for requesting agent location and congestion data, with the push protocol,
which more simply sends out the resident agent?s location and congestion data, does not
impact performance. Our design rationale for this was to reduce the number of messages
sent between agents.
Discussion and related work
The results presented in the previous section offer detailed experimentation incorpo-
rating a variety of metrics to validate the effectiveness of our proposed model. The
experimental evidence presented serves to provide impressive confirmation of the value
of the multi-faceted trust modeling algorithm that is central to the proposed decision
making of the vehicles. With our particular trust modeling in place, even in scenarios
where there is considerable deception in the environment, our vehicles are able to perform
their path planning extremely well, maintaining an effective travel time, without signif-
icant compromise from poor path selection. This paper offers a wealth of experimental
evidence to examine the proposed new trust model in considerable detail, in a thorough
way. All of this is demonstrated due to our significant simulation testbed that can be used
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Figure 7 Avg Path Time comparison, varying message interval.
Figure 8 Avg Path Time comparison, varying number of agents.
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to simulate actual traffic flow with large numbers of cars in a general mobile vehicular
ad-hoc network (and as such constitutes one of the contributions of our work).
The model presented in this paper is one component of a larger framework that
we designed, in order to effectively exchange and record reports between vehicles in
order to direct travel decision making. In particular, we have developed more detailed
proposals for employing ontological representations, for modeling users and for updat-
ing parameter values, the details of which have been omitted from this paper. It is
important to note, however, that the reasoning component of our overall framework is
designed to operate autonomously on a separate thread from all other implementation
components. The only interaction with other components comes from other compo-
nents issuing tasks to the reasoner?s queues. These tasks are either agents of interest or
recently updated local road segments. These are subsequently processed and result in
an update to one or more agents?t trust variables or no action at all. Agents of interest
are agents that have demonstrated either a highly accurate or inaccurate report dur-
ing a congestion evaluation. Recently updated local road segments are road segments
and their congestion value, which have been reported directly from the resident agent.
The reasoner can ultimately inspect its knowledge base to evaluate any propositions that
were reported in within a specific time of this local report. Additional details are offered
in [5].
We note that our simulation is to model a scenario where the actual reports are being
exchanged by drivers (in cases where they may be extreme frequency, due to the number
of cars on the road). While the car?s speed (as mentioned) can be reported as a stand-in
for congestion, certainly GPS readings could form the basis for some automatic vehi-
cle to vehicle reporting. We discuss the potential use of GPS as part of future work, in
Section ?Conclusion and future work?. Note that indirect reports are simply reports that
have been forwarded by other parties and not derived from direct observation.
A focus of the research presented in this paper is our proposal for reasoning with
numeric information provided by agents, set in a framework for modeling trustwor-
thiness according to confidence values. How majority consensus can be computed for
non-Boolean trust modeling is clarified in detail. This research may be of value to
trust modeling researchers considering a variety of possible applications. While we have
sketched our proposed formulae and their validation in the context of a specific VANET
application, the approach is applicable to any scenario where experience-based trust and
majority consensus are to be integrated into the overall determination of user trustworthi-
ness. The formulae in use would simply omit the undesired elements of Equation (3): for
instance, time and location may be irrelevant. The remaining calculations would remain
the same.
The framework presented in this paper required a calculation of majority consensus in
order to guide the decision making of a user. Other researchers have integrated major-
ity opinion into their trust modeling but have instead used this calculation to reflect the
general reputation of an agent (e.g. just how trustworthy a user is may be represented as
a numeric value calculated as the average of all the scores provided by peers (say 1 for
trustworthy and 0 for untrustworthy). For instance, Zhang and Cohen [6] have calcula-
tions that integrate a public reputation into the trustworthiness calculation and that also
weight the contributions provided by peers according to the estimated trustworthiness of
each of the advisors. The Beta Reputation System (BRS) [7] filters out advice about a user
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that is not in the majority and makes use of the rest of advice to model the reputation
of that user. We integrate here important consideration of time and location as well, in
order to value more highly the reports from users closer to the destination. In so doing,
we are able to weight the combination of majority and experience based considerations
more appropriately.
Others have employed a social network for trust modeling (e.g. [8,9] consider trust
propagation in a network but this is less relevant in our sparsely populated environ-
ment) and others propose the use of stereotypical trust [10] (but in our domain a small
set of roles can be used to reflect levels of trust.) Wang and Vassileva [11] also describe
trust as multi-faceted; this work is more focused on having trust calculated differently
in distinct contexts. In addition, their selection of peer advice is based on similar pref-
erences; for our domain, location of the user and the time of its report are more critical
determinants.
Some trust modeling research has introduced Dirichlet distributions in order to rep-
resent trustworthiness as something other than a pure binary value, then predicting
the values of variables based on past experience. BLADE [12] models the evaluation
function of advisor agents in this way, but this research is not focused on how to
set decision making afterwards based on this form of trust modeling. The model of
Fung et al. [13] is focusedmore on direct experience decisionmaking, so not on evaluating
the trustworthiness of the reports of third parties.
Our work also contrasts with other efforts currently proposed for traffic decision
makingu. Also focusing on the modeling of the trustworthiness of vehicular entities, the
sociological trust model proposed by Gerlach in [14] shares some similarities with the
multi-faceted trust management framework of Minhas et al. [1-3]. Gerlach has identi-
fied various forms of trust including situational, dispositional and system. Additionally,
he presents an architecture for securing vehicular communication. However, he does not
provide a formalization of the architecture for combining the different types of trust
together. Raya et al. [15] propose data-centric trust establishment that deals with eval-
uating the trustworthiness of the data reported by other entities rather than trust of
the entities themselves. One of the shortcomings of their work is that trust relation-
ships in entities can never be formed; only ephemeral trust in data is established. Golle
et al. [16] also present a technique that aims to address the problem of detecting and
correcting malicious data in VANETs. Their approach maintains a model of every entity
which contains all the knowledge that a particular entity has about the VANET. Incom-
ing information can then be evaluated against the entity?s model of the VANET. If
all the data received agrees with the model with a high probability, then the entity
accepts the validity of the data. However, this approach assumes that each vehicle has
global knowledge of the network and solely evaluates the validity of data, which may
not be feasible in practice. Dotzer et al. [17] have suggested building a distributed
reputation model that exploits a notion called opinion piggybacking where each for-
warding entity (of the message regarding an event) appends its own opinion about the
trustworthiness of the data. This approach repeatedly makes use of the opinions from
different nodes. The nodes that provide opinions about a message earlier will have larger
influence than the nodes which generated opinions later, which may be undesirable.
Patwardhan et al. [18] propose an approach in which the reputation of an entity is deter-
mined by data validation. In this approach, a few entities, which are named as anchor
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nodes here, are assumed to be pre-authenticated, and thus the data they provide are
regarded as trustworthy. Data can be validated by either agreement among peers or
direct communication with an anchor node. Malicious nodes can be identified if the data
they present is invalidated by the validation algorithm. One problem about this scheme
is that it does not make use of reputation of entities when determining the majority
consensus.
Compared with the above mentioned trust modeling work, our work also provides a
detailed design and implementation for the communication protocols between agents in
the VANET environment, clearly specifying how an agent sends a request for location and
congestion information and how an agent makes use of requested information as part of
its travel decision making. This outlines how agents can effectively operate and interact
with each other in order to facilitate traffic flow within their multiagent system. Another
contribution offered is a proposal for reasoning with information that has been obtained
through frequent broadcasting and polling. This is distinct from simply requesting infor-
mation just prior to a critical decision, which may be challenging for environments such
as ours with dynamic change and real-time decision requirements.
In all, the approach presented in this paper coincides well with several desiderata
for designing multiagent systems for vehicular transportation, as expressed by other
researchers. For example, our efforts to provide detail on the communication needed in
order to support effective travel decision making also coincides well with the arguments
made in [19]: that collaboration between vehicles is important and that communication is
a necessary component for effectively resolving that coordination. In addition, our paper
outlines how a multiagent trust model can assist in directing vehicles with travel decision
making, of assistance in the managing of traffic on our roads. The importance of appro-
priately managing traffic has been discussed at length in [20], which outlines well the
potential that techniques from artificial intelligence afford to assist in the management of
this important problem. That paper in fact also points out the need for effective frame-
works for simulating the network. The testbed that we develop in our research may be of
some assistance in helping to resolve this challenge.
Our final reflection on related work discusses additional efforts within the current lit-
erature on developing simulations for VANET environments and research that draws out
the connection of trust modeling to the messaging networks of MANETs.
At the Agents and Transportation workshop of AAMAS 2014, two papers introduced
new proposals for agent-based simulation of traffic and transportation. The work of
Taillander [21] is interesting in that it allows the fine tuning of various unusual traffic sce-
narios as part of the representation (e.g. car accidents). With this kind of focus, very large
networks were also supported in the simulation. This effort does not consider messag-
ing and trust modeling (but these may be quite interesting extensions to consider, within
this context). The model developed by Huynh et al. [22] is most interested in represent-
ing the collective behaviour of drivers through various simulations, but is of interest as it
focuses on addressing traffic density and on modeling drivers in the environment as deci-
sion makers. within the literature on modeling trust in VANET environments Two recent
short papers offer additional suggestions for simulations in VANET environments. Chou
and Lan [23] clarify that simulations are critical to properly test VANET communication
models. They are interested in modeling the effects on network behaviour of traffic light
changes and cars overtaking each other. Their simulations cover l000 seconds for 300 cars
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(in comparison to our tracking of up to 10000 seconds for examination of 100-car average
path time). Piokorwski et al. [24] emphasize the importance of realistic simulations and
highlight the central role of information exchange; they note that the traces of their
proposed simulation can be used within the JiST/SWANS environment, to acknowledge
its value as a platform. Their exploration of how to play with the mobility of various
vehicles is an interesting additional feature that is offered.
MANETs compared to VANETs surfaces as a theme in the survey paper of [25].
VANETs are claimed to have greater issues of mobility of nodes and network fragmenta-
tion. The paper in turn introduces us to two papers that also provide relevant comparison
to our own work, ones that are more focused on networking characteristics. Shaik and
Alzaharani [26] have a concern with trust focused more on the proliferation of false iden-
tities; false location and time are both cited as of interest, which coincides well with our
proposed model. The TRIP model [27] suggests the combination of direct experience and
reputation (elements contained within ourmodel as well) but assume that a history is built
up for vehicles, travelling consistently on the same roads. A final paper that helps to clar-
ify the use of trust modeling for MANET environments is that of the TARo project [28].
An anonymous routing protocol is proposed and explained in detail. This work illus-
trates the important companion problem of managing identities through cryptographic
research.
Conclusion and future work
In conclusion, we offer an approach for supporting reasoning about agent trust with
advice from peers, whose trustworthiness is then also modeled, when non-numeric
reports are provided and have shown the merit of our framework in the context of the
VANET application (resulting in effective travel decisions due to the modeling of trust-
worthiness). As such, we offer a method that supports the exchange of more detailed
trustworthiness information, leading to more precise and valuable calculations. We have
outlined our method for integrating various reports from peers in full detail. We have
also clarified in depth how communication between peers would take place, through a
combination of push and pull protocols, in order to assure effective exchange of real-
time information and to extend the original model of Minhas et al. [1-3] which left as
underspecified the exchange of information between agents, for effective travel decision
making. Our overall solution integrates a number of novel modeling elements (prior-
ity roads, suspicious reports) which support the final algorithm that is presented. The
detailed simulation framework allows for the adjustment of a wide variety of parame-
ters which have been implemented to draw out the benefit of the full combination of our
methods for trust modeling for effective transportation decisions that support exchange
of traffic information. Included here is a method for simulating a dearth of experience
for experience-based trust (our sparsity parameter), which can be varied in the experi-
ments and a variable to model the extent to which agents in the environment have specific
roles which may increase their trustworthiness (the role parameter). In all, with our
testbed we offer an avenue for measuring the relative benefit of different trust modeling
options. Parts of this research were presented at the TRUMworkshop at UMAP 2012 [29].
There are a number of avenues for future work. The obvious first direction is to explore
a variety of other application domains where agents may need to rely on reports from
peers that offer non-binary trust values. It would be interesting, for instance, to examine
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the possible value of a kind of push and pull-based communication in environments such
as peer recommender systems or electronic marketplaces, where rating scales mirror the
kind of non-binary reports we have been discussing. Another avenue for future work
would be to enhance our current solution for our chosen application of traffic reports and
transportation. In earlier work, we discussed the need to distinguish second-hand reports
from first-hand reports, applying penalties for incorrect reports declared to be first hand
knowledge [2]. Integrating more sophisticated methods for reasoning about the trustwor-
thiness of reports based on whether they were in fact second hand may be of value. In
addition, it is quite apparent that the collective travel decision making of the entire set of
vehicles on the road is an important consideration. Each agent may be advised to make its
final travel decisions by reasoning about the actions likely to be taken by other agents once
they have received (perhaps similar) reports. This is another topic that we are currently
exploring within our research.
The work of Bazzan et al. [30] may shed some light on how to achieve this particular
goal. A form of multiagent reinforcement learning may be effective in coordinating the
activities of the collective of cars on the road. The work of [19] also emphasizes the value
of machine learning for vehicle coordination, again suggesting this as the most promis-
ing first step for our future efforts on this topic. Regardless, the issue of system-wide
coordination is one that has been argued as of significant importance for any intelligent
approaches to managing traffic, as discussed in [20]. As such, this is certainly a valuable
topic for future exploration.
As a final avenue for future work, it would be useful to continue to assess the value
and contribution of our simulation testbed. A useful starting point would be to explore
how to employ the existing testbed for other trust models that have been developed, in
order to demonstrate its robustness. One class of trust models that would be appropriate
to examine are ones based on Dirichlet distributions, designed to cope with multi-valued
information. Extending one of these kinds of models for decision making of agents and
then demonstrating its value with the testbed that we have developed would be an inter-
esting future project. In addition, a paper that has just recently been published [31]
provides an excellent survey of agent-based technology for traffic and transportation;
comparing our simulation testbed and what it offers to designers against frameworks
being explored by other authors, to address other vehicular challenges, would be another
very informative path for future research.
As a final comment, we clarify that this research was designed with a realworld imple-
mentation in mind as the ultimate application. Reflecting on what might actually be
deployed in the future, an implementation as a phone GPS add-on we feel could actually
be possible. Implementing the framework in this manner would allow for easy integration
into a city?s driving population. The Android operating system and platform is a viable
candidate for implementation due to its use of Java as a primary language and the capa-
bility to allow applications access to a wide range of phone systems (such as the GPS).
Android phones also allow multi-threading. The phones could communicate with each
other through minimal Internet access. Once we migrate to the use of GPS, we move to
reflecting on the value of reports exchanged mechanically, so into a territory where delib-
erate misinformation by drivers is less of an issue. In any case, we acknowledge that may
certainly be new avenues for the future to enable vehicles to make travel decisions based
on coordinated communication with other vehicles on the road.
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Endnotes
aFor now, we are assuming that reports are coming in from vehicles on the road rather
than other disassociated entities. As clarified in Section ?Agent communication
protocols to exchange reports?, we distinguish those vehicles reporting first hand
observation from those that are passing on information acquired indirectly.
bFor the remainder of the paper, we use the term agent to refer to the intelligent entity
that is directing the actions of its vehicle. The word user refers to the driver who will
ultimately be deciding where to direct the vehicle.
cThis integrates task-based trust. For instance, an agent may set n to be fairly small, say
n ≤ 10, if she needs to make a quick driving decision, or set a larger n if she has time to
process responses.
dFor example, settingW (Bi) = 1/2 for the case of direct witnesses indicates that the
requesting agent values direct evidence two times more than indirect evidence.
eNote that a reported congestion value for instance of 23 would ideally be representing
the actual number of cars on the road; for our simulation, for example, the actual
number of cars is known and can be reported by truthful vehicles. Agents that are not
truthful will be providing inaccurate values in their reports. It may also be reasonable for
cars to report their speed and for this to be a reflection of the road?s congestion.
fA geometric series is necessary because the calculations are capturing atomic increases
in trust values but we are reasoning about non-Boolean factors that are therefore not
atomic. See Appendix A for a fuller depiction of the geometric series in question.
gThe order of application used throughout our experiments is the one we follow in this
section of the paper.
hNote that we use the absolute value of G as the exponent in order to ensure that the
number of times is a positive number.
iThis is consistent with the placement of these factors in the denominator of Equation 3.
jThis required scaling was not considered in sufficient detail in the model of Minhas
et al. and Equation 3.
kThe trust model described in this paper can be incorporated with a penalty
mechanism such as the one presented in [2] to more severely reduce the trust value of an
agent who is not a direct witness but claims to be one, resulting in the agent not being
responded/helped by other agents in the system.
lLocation closeness is not incorporated because it is dependent on the agent who is
using the report.
mHowever, we use InPenal=-2 in the example here instead for a more effective
illustration.
nProtege is used due to our knowledge-based representation for storing trust and
traffic information; the details of this part of our solution have been omitted in this
paper.
oNote that packet delivery success for the messaging is 100%. We did not simulate
packet failure since this would be too similar to just reducing the volume/frequency of
messages.
pWith no profiling, no trust modeling is done and all reports received are simply
assumed to be entirely trustworthy.
qRouting without traffic just uses a shortest path calculation.
rThe worst case (i.e. No Traffic) is not present so that a finer granularity of the
presented simulations can be shown.
sMessages are sent according to intervals to avoid all agents sending messages at the
same time.
tThis more gradual decrease is likely due in part to the pull protocol requesting
information on roads with more immediate priority and use, generating information on
roads that will be used in decision making.
uA more complete discussion of trust management for VANETs can be found in the
recent survey paper [32].
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Appendix A Confidence geometric series
This appendix seeks to further clarify and detail the geometric series equation and design
rationale for calculating confidence in Section ?Confidence calculation? and to provide
examples.
In Section ?Confidence calculation? we proposed Equation 6(11) for calculating the con-
fidence of a report. Equations 1(12) and 2(13) are used as the basis for calculating the
confidence of report Rj in Equation 6(11), through a modified summation of a geometric
series.
Conf (Rj) = (CurrConf (Rj) ? 1)(1 ? (α or β))G + 1 (11)
The following will describe why a geometric series was necessary.
Equations 12 and 13 shown below are used to modify the trust of an agent. In the frame-
work it is necessary to attribute a trust value to each report from an agent, which we
define as confidence, due to each report having possibly different attributes, such as age




TA(B) + α(1 ? TA(B)) if TA(B) ≥ 0,





TA(B) + β(1 ? TA(B)) if TA(B) ≥ 0,
TA(B) + β(1 + TA(B)) if TA(B) < 0,
(13)
A report?s confidence is initially set to the experience-based trust of the agent that
provided the report. If Equations 12 and 13 were used to atomically increase a report?s
confidence according to various attributes (Time, Loc, Indirect, etc.), then their influence
on confidence would be disproportionate to their value and importance. A simple solu-
tion to this issue would be to weight or multiply α and β according to the attribute (Time,
Loc, Indirect, etc.). However, this can result in the confidence value being above 100% or
below 0%. In addition, to solve this by simply placing a bound on the confidence value
(So that max is 100% and minimum is 0%) would not be faithful to the founding research.
Equations 12 and 13 implicitly boundTA(B), and have an effect of decreasing themagni-
tude by which trust is increased or decreased as the trust value becomes greater or smaller,
respectively. Equation 11 is intended to reflect the culmination of several increases or
decreases, according to 12 and 13. If you were to graph the trust value over all atomic
iterations, the graph would form a Sigmoid function (?S? curve).
Equation 14 for a geometric series is shown below. Equation 15 shows the calculation at
n terms in the series. This is the type of calculation we need because we need to calculate
confidence after Equation 12 or 13 has been applied n times (Equivalent to G in Equation
11). Equation 15 can not be used because it does not take into consideration the result of
the previous calculation, which we need to. Equation 16 describes our calculation, after
Equation 12 or 13 has been applied n times, and the series which we need to represent for
our calculation. Equation 16 describes the need for each term of n terms to sum the result
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of all previous terms. This is due to Equation 12 and 13 multiplying α and β by TA(B) (the
previous trust value). The simplification of Equation 16 is equivalent to Equation 6(11).
a + ar + ar2 + . . . + arn? 1 = a1 ? r
n
1 ? r (14)
an = arn (15)
an = an0 + r(1 + / ? an0) + r(1 + / ? an1)
+r(1 + / ? an2) + . . . + r(1 + / ? ann? 1)
= (a ? 1)(1 ? r)n + 1
(16)
Defining our confidence calculation using Equation 11(6, the simplification of
Equation 16) allows us to utilize Equations 12 and 13, their Sigmoid nature and implicit
bounding, use of decimal numbers for G (n) (providing a granularity that atomic changes
do not allow), and a representation of the calculation in a simple format.
The following example demonstrates the modification of confidence according the time
difference attribute.
Example 3. (Modification of Confidence according to Time)
Confidence0 = Agent_39 : trust_degree (0.6)
α = 0.1
Gtime = (TPenal(90) ? TimeDiff(45))/TPenal(90)
∗MultiplicativeFactor(4)
Gtime = 2(Increase Confidence0 twice)
Confidence0 = 0.6
Confidence1 = (0.6) + α(1 ? (0.6))
= 0.64
Confidence2(Gtime) = 0.64 + α(1 ? (0.64))
= 0.676
(Again using Equation 6)
Confidence2 = (Confidence0 ? 1)(1 ? α)|Gtime| + 1
= ((0.6) ? 1)(1 ? α)2 + 1
= 0.676
Appendix B Simulation curves and parameters
The various curves and parameters used in our simulations are summarized in full in
this appendix. Table 1 displays a fuller description of the different curves that are plotted
in our figures. Table 2 lists various parameters that can be adjusted in the simulations
and displays the default values that we used. Table 3 indicates the variables from our
framework?s formulas which are also modeled in the simulation testbed. The ability to set
all the values shown in the three tables provides deeper insight into the richness of the
simulation testbed that we have designed.
Appendix C Pathing
Agents within the JiST/SWANS simulation software utilize an A* search algorithm that
determines the most effective path for a car to take to its destination.
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Table 1 Simulation types
Name Description Type
No Traffic Simulation without our framework or Worst case scenario
any incorporation of traffic data.
Omni Simulation without our framework Best case scenario
but incorporations traffic data by querying
the road through the JiST/SWANS simulator.
Basic Simulation with just Majority and Experience Basic scenario
based trust.
Full Simulation with all multidimensional Full utilization scenario
trust components.
Full/Basic + (Parameter(s)) Full or Basic simulation with a modification Special case scenario.
on one or more parameters.
The A* search algorithm is the driving force behind when an agent is in need of advice.
The algorithm is called either when a new destination is set for an agent, and the agent has
to find out how to most effectively reach the destination, or if an agent?s path is reassessed
during their journey, so that the algorithm can incorporate more recently received traffic
information.
The A* algorithm used within our framework operates as follows:
1. It is provided with the agent?s current location and destination.
2. It incrementally assesses potential roads, from the current location to the
destination, according to a cost.
(a) The potential road?s cost is calculated as its length plus congestion
(triggers in need of advice).
Table 2 Simulation framework variables
Parameter name Description Representation Default value
Honest agents Percent of honest agents. Hon # (0.5 is 50% honesty) 0.5
Number of agents Number of agents and cars
simulated in the tests.
Agent # (100 is 100 agents) 100
Message interval Interval between congestion
request messages sent by the
agents.
MsgI #-# (6?15 is 6?15
second message intervals)
6-15
Profiling Use of profiling. No P indicates no use of
profiling (False)
True (Basic, Full)
Role Use of role based trust. Role # (0.2 is 20% agents
are given a role above
Ordinary)
0(Basic) 0.2(Full)
Time closeness Use of time closeness factor. Time False(Basic)
True(Full)
Location closeness Use of location closeness factor. Loc False(Basic)
True(Full)
Indirect messages Use of indirect messages. Indirect False(Basic)
True(Full)
Information sparsity Percent of agent trust updates
ignored to simulate data sparsity.
MThresh # (0.6 means
60% of trust updates are
ignored)
0
Dishonest Lie Percent Percent of the time a dishonest
agent lies.
Lie # (0.8 is 80% of the time
dishonest agents lie)
1
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Table 3 Simulation algorithm variables
Parameter name Description Representation Default value
Majority N Number of agents used in a
majority opinion.
MajN # (10 is 10 agents
used)
10
Honest trust increase α Standard increment to an
agent?s trust resulting from
an honesty evaluation, with a
maximum value of 1.0.
α # (0.1 is 10% trust
increase)
0.1
Dishonest trust decrease β Standard decrement to an
agent?s trust resulting from
an honesty evaluation, with a
minimum value of 0.0.
β # (0.2 is 20% trust
decrease)
0.2
Advice trust threshold Threshold where only agents
with a trust value above this
percent may be considered
for advice.
AThresh # (0.41 is 41%
trust threshold)
0.41
Majority confidence threshold Threshold which the majority
opinionmust be above in order
to be considered.
MThresh # (0.51 is 51%
majority threshold)
0.51




Time penalization Standard comparison factor for
time closeness.
TPenal # 90
Location penalization Standard comparison factor for
location closeness.
LPenal # 200
Indirect penalization Standard factor for modifying
confidence if the advice is
indirect.
InPenal # 1
Congestion weight Standard factor for weighting
the congestion value when
calculating a road?s A* cost.
CongWeight # 20
3. It returns a list of roads which forms a path to the destination that has the least cost
(which theoretically takes the shortest amount of time, according to current traffic
information).
The algorithm attributes a cost to every road segment. The JiST/SWANS initially calcu-
lated this cost as the length of the road segment. In our implementation, cost is calculated
as the length of the road segment and its congestion. RoadCong is the congestion of the
road, which is multiplied by a simulation specific weight CongWeight. The retrieval of a
road?s congestion signifies an agent beingin need of advice from Algorithm 4.
To facilitate efficient use of congestion information, and to increase the speed of the A*
search algorithm, the implementation post-processes traffic information to formmajority
opinions so that the information can be immediately retrieved during algorithm execu-
tion. This means that majority opinions are calculated every time new information is
retrieved, which is then stored in a local hash table for constant time (O(1)) retrieval by
the A* algorithm.
Appendix D Pictorial depiction of grid-like maps in simulations
In this appendix, we display one example of the grid-like maps that are used in the third-
party software that forms the backdrop for our simulation testbed. Figure 9 shows a
snapshot of a simulation run where bold lines are extracted road segments and small
rectangles represent vehicles on the streets.
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Figure 9 Simulation run of No Traffic setting.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors? contributions
JF came up with the formulation of the proposed approach and conducted experiments to evaluate the approach. RC
and JZ drafted the paper. TT and UFM proofread the draft and provided comments and suggestions to improve the draft.
JZ was also in charge of submitting the paper and corresponding with the editors of the journal and Springer Open
Production Team. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgement
Thanks to Graham Pinhey for his assistance with this paper. Financial support was received from NSERC (the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada).
Parts of this research were presented at the TRUM workshop at UMAP 2012 [29]. The work is also partially supported by
the project of Dr. Jie Zhang funded by the MOE AcRF Tier 1.
Author details
1David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada. 2School of Computer
Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore. 3School of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada.
Received: 24 October 2013 Accepted: 28 August 2014
References
1. Minhas UF, Zhang J, Tran T, Cohen R (2010) Promoting effective exchanges between vehicular agents in traffic
through transportation-oriented trust modeling. In: Proceedings of international joint conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS) workshop on Agents in Traffic and Transportation (ATT). ACM. pp 77?86
2. Minhas UF, Zhang J, Tran TT, Cohen R (2010) Intelligent agents in mobile vehicular ad-hoc networks: Leveraging
trust modeling based on direct experience with incentives for honesty. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM
international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT). pp 243?247
3. Minhas UF, Zhang J, Tran TT, Cohen R (2011) A multifaceted approach to modeling agent trust for effective
communication in the application of mobile ad hoc vehicular networks. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern C Appl Rev
41(3):407?420
Cohen et al. Journal of Trust Management 2014, 1:10 Page 31 of 31
http://www.journaloftrustmanagement.com/content/1/1/10
4. Tran T, Cohen R (2003) Modelling reputation in agent-based marketplaces to improve the performance of buying
agents. In: Proceedings of the ninth international conference on User Modelling (UM). Springer. pp 273?282
5. Finnson J (2012) Modeling trust in multiagent mobile vehicular ad-hoc networks through enhanced knowledge
exchange for effective travel decision making. Master?s thesis, School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo.
Waterloo, Canada
6. Zhang J, Cohen R (2008) Evaluating the trustworthiness of advice about seller agents in e-marketplaces: a
personalized approach. Electron Commerce Res Appl 7(3):330?340
7. Whitby A, J?sang A, Indulska J (2004) Filtering out unfair ratings in bayesian reputation systems. In: Proceedings of
the Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies, at the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Conference
(AAMAS2004), New York. July 2004
8. Yu B, Singh MP (2003) Detecting deception in reputation management. In: Proceedings of the second international
joint conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. AAMAS ?03. ACM, New York. pp 73?80
9. Yolum P, Singh MP (2005) Engineering self-organizing referral networks for trustworthy service selection. IEEE Trans
Syst Man Cybern Syst Hum 35(3):396?407
10. Burnett C, Norman T, Sycara K (2011) Sources of stereotypical trust in multi-agent systems. In: Proceedings of the
14th international workshop on trust in agent societies. p 25
11. Wang Y, Vassileva J (2003) Bayesian network-based trust model. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC international
conference on Web Intelligence (WI). pp 372?378
12. Regan K, Poupart P, Cohen R (2006) Bayesian reputation modeling in e-marketplaces sensitive to subjectivity,
deception and change. In: AAAI. pp 1206?1212
13. Fung CJ, Zhang J, Aib I, Boutaba R (2011) Dirichlet-based trust management for effective collaborative intrusion
detection networks. IEEE Trans Netw Serv Manag 8(2):79?91
14. Gerlach M (2007) Trust for vehicular applications. In: Proceedings of the international symposium on autonomous
decentralized systems. IEEE. pp 295?304
15. Raya M, Papadimitratos P, Gligor VD, Hubaux J-P (2008) On data-centric trust establishment in ephemeral ad hoc
networks. In: Proceedings of the 27th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE
INFOCOM). pp 1238?1246
16. Golle P, Greene D, Staddon J (2004) Detecting and correcting malicious data in vanets. In: Proceedings of the 1st
ACM international workshop on vehicular ad hoc networks. ACM. pp 29?37
17. Dotzer F, Fischer L, Magiera P (2005) VARS: a vehicle ad-hoc network reputation system. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
international symposium on a world of wireless, mobile and multimedia networks. pp 453?456
18. Patwardhan A, Joshi A, Finin T, Yesha Y (2006) A data intensive reputation management scheme for vehicular ad hoc
networks. In: Proceedings of the Third Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems:
Networking & Services. IEEE. pp 1?8
19. Desjardins C, Laum?nier J, Chaib-draa B (2009) Learning agents for collaborative driving. In: Bazzan A, Kl?gl F (eds).
Multiagent systems for traffic and transportation engineering. IGI Global, Hershey. pp 240?260
20. Bazzan AL (2007) Traffic as a complex system: Four challenges for computer science and engineering. In:
Proceedings of the XXXIV SEMISH. Citeseer. pp 2128?2142
21. Taillandier P (2014) Traffic simulation with the gama platform. In: Klugel F, Bazzan A, Ossowoski S, Chaib-Draa B (eds).
Proceedings of the international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) sixth
workshop on Agents in Traffic and Transportation (ATT). pp 77?86
22. Huynh N, Cao VL, Wickramasuriya R, Berryman M, Perez P, Barthelemy J (2014) An agent based model for the
simulation of road traffic and transport demand in a Sydney metropolitan area. In: Klugel F, Bazzan A, Ossowoski S,
Chaib-Draa B (eds). Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS) sixth workshop on Agents in Traffic and Transportation (ATT)
23. Chou C-M, Lan K-c (2009) On the effects of detailed mobility models in vehicular network simulations. In:
Proceedings of the ACM MobiCom
24. Piorkowski M, Raya M, Lugo AL, Papadimitratos P, Grossglauser M, Hubaux J-P (2008) TraNS: realistic joint traffic and
network simulator for VANETs. ACM SIGMOBILE mobile computing and communications review 12(1):31?33
25. Vidhya S, Mugunthan SR (2014) Trust modeling scheme using cluster aggregation of messages for vehicular ad hoc
networks. IOSR J Comput Eng 16(2):16?21
26. Shaihk R, Alzahrani A (2013) Intrusion-aware trust model for vehicular ad hoc networks. Security and
Communication Networks. doi:10.1002/sec.862
27. Marmola FG, Pere GM (2012) Trip, a trust and reputation infrastructure-based proposal for vehicular ad hoc
networks. J Netw Comput Appl 35(3):934?941
28. Chen J, Boreli R, Sivaraman V (2010) Taro: Trusted anonymous routing for manets. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/IFIP 8th
international conference on embedded and ubiquitous computing. pp 756?762
29. Finnson J, Cohen R, Zhang J, Tran T, Minhas UF (2012) Reasoning about user trustworthiness with non-binary advice
from peers. Adaptation and Personalization (UMAP) workshop on Trust, Reputation and User Modeling (TRUM). pp 12
30. Bazzan ALC, de Oliveira D, da Silva BC (2010) Learning in groups of traffic signals. Eng Appl Artif Intell 23(4):560?568
31. Bazzan A, Klugl F (2013) A review on agent-based technology for traffic and transportation. Knowl Eng Rev:1?29.
doi:10.1017/S0269888913000118
32. Zhang J (2011) A survey on trust management for vanets. In: Proceedings of the 25th international conference on
Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA). IEEE. pp 105?112
doi:10.1186/s40493-014-0010-0
Cite this article as: Cohen et al.: A trust-based framework for vehicular travel with non-binary reports and its
validation via an extensive simulation testbed. Journal of Trust Management 2014 1:10.
